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1Energy-Constrained UAV-Assisted Secure Communications
with Position Optimization and Cooperative Jamming
Wei Wang, Member, IEEE, Xinrui Li, Miao Zhang, Kanapathippillai Cumanan, Senior Member, IEEE,
Derrick Wing Kwan Ng, Senior Member, IEEE, Guoan Zhang, Jie Tang, Senior Member, IEEE,
and Octavia A. Dobre, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we consider an energy-constrained
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-enabled mobile relay assisted
secure communication system in the presence of a legitimate
source-destination pair and multiple eavesdroppers with imper-
fect locations. The energy-constrained UAV employs the power
splitting (PS) scheme to simultaneously receive information
and harvest energy from the source, and then exploits the
time switching (TS) protocol to perform information relaying.
Furthermore, we consider a full-duplex destination node which
can simultaneously receive confidential signals from the UAV and
cooperatively transmit artificial noise (AN) signals to confuse
malicious eavesdroppers. To further enhance the reliability and
security of this system, we formulate a worst case secrecy rate
maximization problem, which jointly optimizes the position of the
UAV, the AN transmit power, as well as the PS and TS ratios. The
formulated problem is non-convex and generally intractable. In
order to circumvent the non-convexity, we decouple the original
optimization problem into three subproblems; this facilitates the
design of a suboptimal iterative algorithm. In each iteration,
we propose a multi-dimensional search and numerical method
to handle the subproblem. Numerical simulation results are pro-
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vided to demonstrate the effectiveness and superior performance
of the proposed joint design versus the conventional schemes in
the literature.
Index Terms—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) communica-
tions, physical layer security, simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT), robust design, artificial noise (AN).
I. INTRODUCTION
THE high mobility and flexibility of unmanned aerial vehi-cles (UAVs) make their deployment possible in the fifth-
generation (5G) and beyond wireless networks [1]–[4]. How-
ever, in contrast to the conventional wireless communication
systems, UAV-ground communications are more vulnerable to
eavesdropping as they can be easily intercepted by potential
eavesdroppers due to the inherent broadcast nature of the line-
of-sight (LoS) dominated wireless channels. Therefore, UAV-
ground communications bring up different security challenges
[5]–[7], which need to be addressed to unlock the potential
of UAV-based communications.
Recently, physical layer security has emerged as a promis-
ing technology to realize secrecy in wireless communications
[8]–[14], while complementing the conventional encryption
techniques in UAV networks. In the literature, different
physical layer security-based designs have been proposed
to improve the performance of UAV-assisted communication
systems. For instance, a joint transceiver design for UAV-
ground secure communications was proposed in [15], where
the secrecy rate was maximized by jointly optimizing the
UAV’s trajectory and its transmit power. Later on, physical
layer security was extended to both the downlink and uplink
of an UAV-ground communication system in [16], where the
average secrecy rate was maximized by jointly optimizing
the UAV’s trajectory and the transmit power of the legitimate
transmitter over a given flight duration of the UAV. In [17],
the authors considered a utility optimization problem to max-
imize the secrecy rate in UAV-enabled mobile relaying secure
communications by jointly designing the transmit power of a
source and a relay node. Moreover, a caching UAV-assisted
secure transmission scheme was investigated in hyper-dense
small-cell networks to enhance coverage and to increase the
system secrecy rate in [18]. A secrecy rate maximization
problem for an UAV-enabled mobile jamming system was
studied in [19], which a joint design of trajectory and power
control scheme was proposed. Furthermore, a secure trans-
mission scheme for UAV wiretap channels was considered
2in the presence of a full-duplex (FD) eavesdropper in [20].
However, the aforementioned works, e.g., [15]–[20], assumed
that perfect knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ locations is
available at the transmitter for resource allocation and trajec-
tory design, which is difficult to realize in practical scenarios.
In particular, eavesdroppers may remain silent to hide their
existence and obtaining their perfect location information is
unrealistic. More importantly, applying the designs based on
perfect location information of eavesdroppers may result in
significant degradation of security performance. In addition,
the works in [15]–[20] only considered the case of a single
eavesdropper, which is typically an unrealistic assumption in
many practical and emerging scenarios. Therefore, designing
the position of an UAV taking into account the existence of
multiple eavesdroppers for enhancing the secrecy performance
is an utmost important set of challenges. To address these
issues, a secure UAV communication system in the presence
of multiple eavesdroppers with imperfect locations was con-
sidered in [21], where a joint robust trajectory design and
power control scheme was proposed to maximize the average
worst-case secrecy rate. However, it is noted that the sizes
and weights of UAVs are usually small for enabling both high
flexibility and safety [15]–[21], which results in UAVs having
limited onboard energy storage with short cruising duration.
To overcome this difficulty, energy-constrained UAV-aided
communications have drawn a significant increasing research
interests recently. For instance, a joint design of UAV’s tra-
jectory, propulsion energy consumption, and communication
throughput was proposed to maximize the energy efficiency
with a simple fixed circular trajectory in [22]. In [23], the
authors investigated a fundamental energy tradeoff problem
in UAV-enabled data collection system with two practical
fixed UAV trajectories, namely circular flight and straight
flight. Furthermore, a joint sensor nodes’ schedule and UAV
trajectory design was studied in [24] to minimize the maxi-
mum energy consumption within all sensor nodes. However,
reducing the energy consumption of UAV by adjusting ei-
ther its location or power allocation does not fundamentally
solve the energy shortage problem of UAV for prolonging
system lifetime. Instead of reducing energy consumption,
energy harvesting (EH) from surrounding environments has
been considered as an emerging solution to effectively ex-
tend the operational time of energy-constrained UAVs [25]–
[27]. Recently, the simultaneous wireless information and
power transfer (SWIPT) technique has received considerable
attention for energy-constrained UAV communications as the
radio frequency (RF) signals can be exploited to carry both
information and energy. For instance, in [28], the authors
studied the throughput maximization problem for a typical
end-to-end cooperative communication system, where an UAV
was assumed to be an aerial mobile relay and its transmission
was powered by the harvested energy in the RF signal from the
source. Besides, an orthogonal frequency division multiplex-
ing (OFDM) relaying-based SWIPT UAV communication sys-
tem was proposed in [29], where the energy-constrained UAV
exploits the power splitting (PS) scheme to simultaneously
perform EH and information decoding (ID). Furthermore,
in [30], a joint UAV location deployment, PS, and time
switching (TS) ratio design was investigated to maximize the
network throughput in an energy-constraint UAV amplify-and-
forward relaying system. Despite the research efforts devoted
to SWIPT in UAV-ground communications, the security issue
of SWIPT-aided UAV wireless communication has drawn little
attention so far. In fact, although the applications of SWIPT
have brought various advantages to communication systems,
it is also known that SWIPT-powered systems are more
vulnerable than conventional systems in terms of security
[31], [32]. More importantly, existing designs, e.g., [28]–
[30], may not be applicable to the case when communication
security is utmost important in SWIPT-aided UAV systems.
It is worth noting that there have been some initial attempts
(e.g., [33]) that address the security issues of SWIPT-powered
UAV-ground communication systems. In [33], the authors
investigated an UAV-assisted SWIPT system in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers, where the secrecy rate was maximized
by jointly optimizing the trajectory and transmit power of
the UAV. Nevertheless, the authors in [33] assumed that the
locations of eavesdroppers were perfect, and results are not
applicable to practical cases with imperfect location informa-
tion.
Motivated by the aforementioned aspects, in this paper we
consider an UAV-ground secure communication system, where
a source transmits information to a legitimate destination via
an energy-constrained UAV-enabled mobile relay in the pres-
ence of multiple eavesdroppers.1 In particular, it is assumed
that the imperfect locations of all potential eavesdroppers are
available. As such, the energy-constrained UAV receives infor-
mation and harvests energy from the source, and then forwards
the secret messages to the destination. Furthermore, in order
to combat multiple eavesdroppers with imperfect locations
information, we employ a destination node which operates
in FD mode, i.e., it can simultaneously receive confidential
signals (CS) from the UAV and transmit artificial noise (AN)
to confuse the eavesdroppers. We then define and evaluate the
worst-case secrecy rate, which shows the performance of both
communication reliability of the legitimate link (between the
UAV and destination) and the communication confidentiality
to the multiple eavesdroppers. We aim to maximize the mini-
mum secrecy rate under the constraints of the position, EH at
the UAV, the maximum transmit power, and AN power level at
the destination node. To the best of our knowledge, the robust
design for SWIPT-assisted UAV secure communications has
not been reported in the literature, and our contributions are
summarized as follows:
1) The proposed robust joint design enhances both security
performance and battery lifetime of the considered UAV
1This system setting has a number of potential applications in wireless
networks, e.g., in cellular systems, when a legitimate source-destination pair
cannot communicate directly, and then, an aerial relay should be employed
to establish this communication without the support of a fixed site and power
supply.
3TABLE I
LIST OF FUNDAMENTAL VARIABLES.
Symbol Description
α Time switching ratio
ρ Power splitting ratio
T Flight period of UAV
hab Channel coefficient between a and b
fd Self-interference channel coefficient
β0 Channel power gain at a reference distance
ζ Exponentially distributed random variable
dab Distance between a and b
η Energy conversion efficiency
β Amplification factor
ε Effectiveness of SIC
σ2
{r,d,e}
Variance of AWGN
σ2ID Noise variance of ID
σ2Zd
Noise variance of AN
Ps Transmit power of S
Pr Transmit power of UAV
Pcr Circuit power consumption of UAV
Pr,max Maximum transmit power of UAV
PAN,max Maximum transmit power of AN
rmax Maximum flight radius of UAV
system, which is more suitable for practical scenarios when
compared to the existing works on UAV secure communica-
tions [21], [33], [34].
2) To circumvent the non-convexity issue of the formulated
design problem, we first decompose the considered prob-
lem into three subproblems. Then, we propose the multi-
dimensional search and numerical methods to handle the
subproblems.
3) By iteratively solving the three subproblems, a subop-
timal solution of the original problem is realized. In each
iteration, we derive closed-form expressions for the position
of the UAV, the AN transmit power vector of the destination,
the PS and TS ratio, which provide important insights related
to the system design.
4) Extensive simulation results are provided to demonstrate
the impacts of different parameters and the superior perfor-
mance of the proposed joint robust design against other four
benchmark schemes in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
system model and the formulation of the minimum secrecy
rate maximization problem are presented in Section II, while
a three-step alternating algorithm is developed in Section III
to obtain a suboptimal solution of the optimization problem
at hand. Section IV provides simulation results to validate the
effectiveness of our proposed design, and finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
Notations: E(·) represents the statistical expectation and
| · | denotes the absolute value of a complex number. The
distribution of a circular symmetric complex Gaussian vector
with mean vector x and covariance matrix Σ is denoted by
CN (x,Σ). The notation (m)+ stands for max(0,m). A list
of the fundamental variables is provided in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider a legitimate UAV-ground secure
communication system as shown in Fig. 1, where a source S
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Fig. 1. System model for a SWIPT-based UAV secure relay network.
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Fig. 2. Joint TS and PS-based SWIPT protocol for UAV-assisted relaying.
intends to transmit confidential information to a destination
D through an UAV-assisted mobile relay R in the presence of
multiple independent eavesdroppers {E1, E2, · · · , En}. It is
assumed that the source, the UAV and the eavesdroppers are
single-antenna devices, while the FD destination is equipped
with a dual antenna, one for signal transmission and the other
for signal reception. Specifically, the UAV is powered by an
energy-limited onboard battery which needs to harvest energy
from the power-supply source. Since the propulsion energy
consumption of the UAV is much larger than that of the
wireless transmission in practical scenarios, we assume that
the onboard battery supplies for the flight control of UAVs
while the harvested energy accounts only for its information
transmission and circuit power consumption, as commonly
adopted in the literature [28]–[30]. The SWIPT-based EH
and ID protocol is presented in Fig. 2. In the first phase
αT , with α ∈ [0, 1] representing the TS ratio, the source
transmits information and energy simultaneously to the UAV.
In the second phase (1 − α)T , the received signal at the
relay UAV is amplified and then forwarded to the destination
and eavesdroppers.2 In this phase, the FD destination also
acts as a jammer to cooperatively transmit AN to reduce
the received signal-to-interference plus-noise ratio (SINR)
at the eavesdroppers. Without loss of generality, a three-
dimensional Cartesian coordinate system is considered, where
the source and destination nodes are located at (xS , 0, 0) and
(xD, 0, 0), respectively. (xk, yk, 0) denotes the exact location
of the k-th eavesdropper, Ek, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, which is
unknown to the legitimate system. However, we assume that
2In contrast to the decode-and-forward scheme, the amplify-and-forward
scheme requires less energy consumption and provides more degrees of
freedom to the UAV system design, which is more suitable for energy-
constrained UAV-assisted communication scenarios [28].
4the UAV and the destination have the capability to estimate
the locations of Ek, i.e., (xEk , yEk , 0) [21], [33]. Furthermore,
it is assumed that the UAV flies at the fixed altitude H
[15]–[19], [21], [33], [35], hence, the position of the UAV
can be expressed by its Cartesian coordinate (x, y,H). The
channels between S and the UAV as well as D are denoted
by hsr and hrd, respectively. Besides, hrek and hdek denote
the channel coefficients between Ek and the UAV as well
as D, respectively. We assume that all the above channels are
LoS channels.3 Moreover, fd denotes random self-interference
channel at the destination. In addition, it is also assumed that
there is no direct link between the source and destination as
well as eavesdroppers, due to heavy shadowing or existence
of obstacles.
Under the above setting, the channel gains hsr, hrd, hrek ,
and hdek can be respectively expressed as:
h2sr =
β0
d2sr
=
β0
(x− xS)2 + y2 +H2 ,
h2rd =
β0
d2rd
=
β0
(x− xD)2 + y2 +H2 ,
h2rek =
β0
d2rek
=
β0
(x− xk)2 + (y − yk)2 +H2 ,
h2dek =
β0
d2dek
=
β0
(xk − xD)2 + (yk − yD)2 ζ,
(1)
where β0 denotes the channel power gain at a reference
distance of d = 1 m [15]–[21], [28]–[30], [33], and ζ is
an exponentially distributed random variable with unit mean
accounting for the Rayleigh fading [16]. The parameters dsr =√
(x− xS)2 + y2 +H2, drd =
√
(x− xD)2 + y2 +H2,
drek =
√
(x− xk)2 + (y − yk)2 +H2, and ddek =√
(xk − xD)2 + (yk − yD)2 represent the distances between
S-to-UAV, UAV-to-D, UAV-to-Ek and D-to-Ek, respectively.
As the locations of the eavesdroppers are imperfectly
known, the relations between the actual and the estimated x, y
coordinates of Ek are defined, respectively as
xk = xEk +∆xk, (2)
and
yk = yEk +∆yk, (3)
where∆xk and∆yk denote the estimation errors. These errors
are assumed to be bounded within a circle, i.e., (∆xk,∆yk) ∈
ξ , {(∆xk,∆yk)|∆x2k+∆y2k ≤ ∆Q2k}, where ∆Q2k denotes
the magnitude square of the maximum estimation error [21],
[31].
In the first phase αT , the received signal at the UAV can
be expressed as
yr = hsrxt + nr, (4)
where xt denotes the transmit signal from S with transmit
power E(|xt|2) = Ps and nr represents a circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian (CSCG) additive white Gaussian noise
3The LoS channel model is a reasonable approximation for UAV-ground
communications in practice, which has been already adopted in many works
in the literature, e.g., [15]–[21], [28]–[30], [33].
(AWGN) at the UAV with a distribution CN (0, σ2r). Based on
the proposed SWIPT protocol in Fig. 2, the received signal at
the ID and the EH circuits can be respectively expressed as
yIDr =
√
ρ(hsrxt + nr) + nID, (5)
and
yEHr =
√
1− ρ(hsrxt + nr), (6)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] represents the PS ratio and nID is the noise
introduced by the ID circuit, which follows a distribution
CN (0, σ2ID). In general, the harvested energy is a nonlinear
function with respect to the received RF power [36], [37].
However, there is no a generic EH model which can captures
all practical issues [38]. Therefore, for simplicity, we consider
a linear EH model which has been commonly adopted in the
literature [28]–[30], [33]. Accordingly, the harvested energy
at the UAV is defined as
EEHr = ηαT (1− ρ)Ps|hsr|2, (7)
where η ∈ (0, 1] denotes the energy conversion efficiency.
In the second phase (1−α)T , the signal transmitted by the
UAV can be written as
xr =
√
βyIDr =
√
β(
√
ρhsrxt +
√
ρnr + nID), (8)
where β denotes the amplification factor adopted at the UAV
[39], [40]. Then, the transmit power of the UAV is E(|xr|2) =
Pr, which can be defined as
Pr = βρPs|hsr|2 + βρσ2r + βσ2ID. (9)
For the FD destination, after self-interference cancellation
(SIC) [41]–[43], its received signal is given by
yd = hrdxr + nd
=
√
β
√
ρhrdhsrxt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relayed signal
+
√
β
√
ρhrdnr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relayed noise
+
√
βhrdnID︸ ︷︷ ︸
ID noise
+ fd
√
εzd︸ ︷︷ ︸
Residual AN
+ nd︸︷︷︸
AWGN
,
(10)
where ε ∈ [0, 1] denotes the effectiveness of the adopted SIC.
zd and nd represent the AN and AWGN at the destination,
which follow the distribution zd ∼ CN (0, σ2Zd) and nd ∼CN (0, σ2d), respectively. Thus, the SINR and the achievable
data rate at the destination are respectively defined as
SINRd
=
βρPs|hrdhsr|2
βρσ2r |hrd|2 + βσ2ID|hrd|2 + εσ2Zd |fd|2 + σ2d
,
(11)
and
Rd = (1− α)log2(1 + SINRd). (12)
At the same time, the received signal at the k-th eavesdrop-
per can be expressed as
yek =hrekxr + hdekzd + nek
=
√
β
√
ρhrekhsrxt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relayed signal
+
√
β
√
ρhreknr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relayed noise
+
√
βhreknID︸ ︷︷ ︸
ID noise
+ hdekzd︸ ︷︷ ︸
AN signal
+ nek︸︷︷︸
AWGN
,
(13)
5where nek represents the AWGN at the k-th eavesdropper
node with a distribution CN (0, σ2e). Therefore, the SINR and
the achievable data rate of Ek are respectively expressed as
SINRek
=
βρPs|hrekhsr|2
βρσ2r |hrek |2 + βσ2ID|hrek |2 + σ2Zd|hdek |2 + σ2e
,
(14)
and
Rek = (1− α)log2(1 + SINRek). (15)
Here, we consider a max-min secrecy rate optimization
problem in a SWIPT-powered UAV relaying system with
multiple eavesdroppers, where the secrecy rate between S and
D is maximized by jointly optimizing the AN transmit power
of the destination, the TS and PS ratios of the SWIPT protocol,
as well as the amplification factor and position of the UAV.
This problem can be formulated as
max
σ2
Zd
,α,ρ,β,(x,y)
[
Rd − max
k∈{1,2,...,n}
max
∆xk,∆yk∈ξ
{Rek}
]+
s.t. C1 : (1− α)T (Pr + Pcr) ≤ EEHr ,
C2 : (1− α)Tσ2Zd + ESIC ≤ Ed,
C3 :
√
x2 + y2 ≤ rmax,
C4 : Pr ≤ Pr,max,
C5 : σ2Zd ≤ PAN,max,
C6 : 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 < β < 1,
(16)
where [m]+ , max(m, 0). Pcr in constraint C1 denotes
the UAV’s circuit power consumption [44] such that UAV
transmission and circuit power consumption should be less
than the total harvested energy. ESIC and Ed represent the
energy consumptions of SIC and the energy budget of the
destination, respectively. C3 is the constraint on the position
of the UAV, in which rmax denotes UAV maximum flight
radius. Pr,max and PAN,max denote the maximum transmit
power of UAV and AN, respectively.
Remark 1: In this paper, only the position of the UAV is
optimized. This is due to the fact that we focus on the cases
when an UAV needs to steer away from the estimated location
of multiple eavesdroppers while approaching its intended
receiver as close as possible at the same time to enhance the
secrecy rate. For this scenario, the UAV position design is
particularly appealing since it can strike a balance between
communication efficiency and security.
III. JOINT DESIGN OF THE MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section, we maximize the minimum secrecy rate by
jointly designing the AN transmit power, the TS and PS ratios,
as well as the UAV’s position and amplification factor. It is
obvious that the formulated problem in (16) is not convex and
difficult to solve due to the coupling between variables σ2Zd, α,
ρ, β, and (x, y) in both SINR and transmit power constraints.
Furthermore, the imperfect locations of the eavesdroppers
impose semi-infinite numbers of constraints, which make the
TABLE II
PROPOSED MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SEARCH FOR SOLVING (18).
1: Set the search range [−∆Qk, 3∆Qk], k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and
search interval τ = 0.05;
2: Initialize ∆xL
k
= −∆Qk , g
L
k
= 1000, L = 1;
3: While ∆Qk > 0 do
4: While ∆xL
k
< 3∆Qk do
5: If ∆xL
k
≤ ∆Qk , calculate ∆y
L
k
=
√
(∆Qk)2 − (∆x
L
k
)2;
6: Determine gL(∆xL
k
,∆yL
k
) and gL
k
= min{gL(∆xL
k
,∆yL
k
), gL
k
};
7: Else compute ∆yL
k
= −
√
(∆Qk)2 − (∆x
L
k
− 2∆Qk)2;
8: Determine gL(∆xL
k
,∆yL
k
) and gL
k
= min{gL(∆xL
k
,∆yL
k
), gL
k
};
9: End
10: Update ∆xL
k
= ∆xL
k
+ τ and L = L+ 1;
11: Update ∆Qk = ∆Qk − τ ;
12: Return g∗
k
= gL
k
, ∆x∗
k
= ∆xL
k
, ∆y∗
k
= ∆yL
k
;
13: Output g∗ = min{g∗
1
, g∗
2
, ..., g∗n}.
optimization problem more intractable. To tackle these non-
convexity issues, we first define R∗e as the upper bound of
the achieved rate of Ek in the presence of estimation errors,
which is equivalent to
R∗e = max
k∈{1,2,...,n}
max
∆xk,∆yk∈ξ
{Rek}
= max
k∈{1,2,...,n}
max
∆xk,∆yk∈ξ
(1− α)log2
(
1+
βρPs|hsr|2
βρσ2r + βσ
2
ID +
σ2
Zd
|hdek |
2+σ2e
|hrek |
2
)
s.t. ∆x2k +∆y
2
k ≤ ∆Q2k, ∀k.
(17)
In the following, we aim to determine the highest achievable
rate of the multiple eavesdroppers with imperfect locations
for a given position of the UAV, which facilitates the design
of resource allocation in later sections. To efficiently solve
problem (17), we introduce a new variable g(∆xk,∆yk) =
σ2Zd|hdek |
2+σ2e
|hrek |
2 =
σ2Zdβ0d
2
rek
+σ2ed
2
rek
d2dek
β0d
2
dek
, where d2rek = (x −
(xEk + ∆xk))
2 + (y − (yEk + ∆yk))2 + H2 and d2dek =
((xEk + ∆xk) − xD)2 + ((yEk + ∆yk) − yD)2; then, the
problem defined in (17) can be equivalently reformulated as
follows:
min
k∈{1,2,...,n}
min
∆xk,∆yk∈ξ
g(∆xk,∆yk)
s.t. ∆Q2k −∆x2k −∆y2k ≥ 0.
(18)
The problem defined in (18) is still difficult to be solved
optimally due to the coupled variables drek and ddek in both
numerator and denominator of g(∆xk,∆yk). To tackle this
issue, we propose a multi-dimensional line search to obtain
an approximated optimal solution, which is summarized in
Table II. As a result, the problem (16) can be simplified as
max
σ2
Zd
,α,ρ,β,(x,y)
[Rd −R∗e ]+
s.t. C1− C6.
(19)
Remark 2: From Table II, for a given position of the UAV,
due to the limitation of the estimation errors, an approximated
optimal solution (∆x∗k,∆y
∗
k) can be obtained by adjusting the
search interval τ , which provides a tight upper bound R∗e to
problem (17).
6Then, to tackle the non-smoothness of the objective function
of problem (19), the following lemma is presented.
LEMMA 1. Problem (19) has the same optimal solution as
that of the following problem:
max
σ2
Zd
,α,ρ,β,(x,y)
Rd −R∗e
s.t. C1− C6.
(20)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. 
Although problem (20) resolves the non-smoothness of
the objective function, the optimization problem is still non-
convex due to the coupling of multiple variables. As a
compromise approach, we aim to design a suboptimal iterative
algorithm by dividing the problem at hand into three sub-
problems and solve them iteratively [45], [46]. The key idea
is to optimize a subset of variables while the remaining ones
are fixed to obtain the locally optimal solution.
A. Joint Optimization of AN Transmit Power σ2Zd and TS
Ratio α
For given ρ, β, and (x, y), the problem defined in (20) can
be reformulated into the following form:
max
σ2
Zd
,α
(1− α)
[
A1 − log2
(
1 +
A2
A3 + σ2Zd
)]
s.t. C1 : σ2Zd(1− α) +A4 ≤ 0,
C2 : A5 ≤ α,
C3 : σ2Zd ≤ PAN,max,
C4 : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
(21)
where A1 = log2(1 + SINRd), A2 =
βρPs|h
∗
rehsr|
2
|h∗
de
|2 , A3 =
βρσ2r |h
∗
re|
2+βσ2ID|h
∗
re|
2+σ2e
|h∗
de
|2 , A4 = −Ed−ESICT and A5 =
βρPs|hsr|
2+βρσ2r+βσ
2
ID+Pcr
βρPs|hsr|2+βρσ2r+βσ
2
ID
+Pcr+η(1−ρ)Ps|hsr|2
.
Now, we adopt the following theorem to solve the problem
defined in (21).
THEOREM 1. The optimal solution of problem (21) can be
obtained in the following three cases:
• When constraints C1 and C2 are satisfied with equality,
the optimal solutions {σ2Zd∗, α∗} are given by
σ2Zd
∗
=− A4
1−A5 ,
α∗ =A5.
(22)
• When constraints C1 and C3 are satisfied with equality,
the optimal solutions {σ2Zd∗, α∗} can be expressed as
σ2Zd
∗
=PAN,max,
α∗ =1 +
A4
PAN,max
.
(23)
• When constraints C2 and C3 are satisfied with equality,
the optimal solutions {σ2Zd∗, α∗} can be denoted as
σ2Zd
∗
=PAN,max,
α∗ =A5.
(24)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. 
We compare the values of the objective function by sub-
stituting (22)−(24) into (21) and select one with the highest
objective value as the optimal solution.
Remark 3: From Theorem 1, the optimal AN transmit power
σ2Zd and the TS ratio α for given ρ, β, and (x, y) can be jointly
attained as a closed-formed expression. Furthermore, as can
be seen from (22)−(24), only a small AN is needed when the
UAV harvested energy is fully used for information relaying.
B. Optimization of PS Ratio ρ
In this subsection, we fix variables σ2Zd, α, β, and (x, y)
for optimizing the PS ratio, ρ, at the UAV. Then the problem
defined in (20) can be equivalently recast as follows by
introducing a new variable m = 1
ρ
:
max
m
1 + 1
B1+B2m
1 + 1
B3+B4m
s.t. 1 < B5 ≤ m,
B6 ≤ m,
(25)
where B1 =
σ2r
Ps|hsr|2
, B2 =
βσ2ID|hrd|
2+σ2SI |fd|
2+σ2d
βPs|hrdhsr|2
,
B3 =
σ2r
Ps|hsr|2
, B4 =
βσ2ID|h
∗
re|
2+σ2Zd|h
∗
de|
2+σ2e
βPs|h∗rehsr|
2 ,
B5 =
(1−α)βPs|hsr|
2+αηPs|hsr|
2+(1−α)βσ2r
αηPs|hsr|2−(1−α)(βσ2ID+Pcr)
, and
B6 =
βPs|hsr|
2+βσ2r
Pr,max−βσ2ID
.
THEOREM 2. B2 < B4 always hold and the optimal solution
of the problem defined in (25) can be derived in the following
two closed-forms:
• When B7 < max{B5, B6}, the optimal ρ∗ can be given
by
ρ∗ = min
{
1
B5
,
1
B6
}
, (26)
where B7 =
√
B1B3+B1
B2B4
.
• When B7 ≥ max{B5, B6}, the optimal ρ∗ can be
denoted as
ρ∗ =
1
B7
. (27)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. 
Remark 4: Based on Theorem 2, for given σ2Zd, α, β, and
(x, y), the optimal PS ratio, ρ, can be derived as a closed-form
expression. Thus, we can always split the received signal at
the UAV into two optimal portions for EH and ID. Evidently,
the system prefers to assign more signal power on ID with
lower value of Bn, n ∈ {5, 6, 7}.
C. Joint Optimization of UAV’s Position (x, y) and Amplifi-
cation Factor β.
With fixed variables σ2Zd, α, and ρ, the problem defined in
(20) can be reformulated as
max
β,(x,y)
1 + βρPs|hrdhsr|
2
βρσ2r |hrd|
2+βσ2
ID
|hrd|2+σ2SI |fd|
2+σ2
d
1 +
βρPs|h∗rehsr|
2
βρσ2r |h
∗
re|
2+βσ2
ID
|h∗re|
2+σ2
Zd
|h∗
de
|2+σ2e
s.t. C1, C3, C4.
(28)
7TABLE III
PROPOSED MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SEARCH FOR SOLVING (28).
1: Set the search radius rϵ[0, rmax], the search range [−r, 3r] and
search interval τ = 0.05;
2: Initialize x = −r, r = 0, R = 0;
3 While r ≤ rmax do
4: While x < 3r do
5: If x ≤ r, calculate y =
√
r2 − (x)2;
6: Else compute y = −
√
r2 − (x− 2r)2;
7: End
8: If D7 < max{D5, D6}, Determine β∗ = min{
1
D5
, 1
D6
};
9: Else Determine β∗ = 1
D7
;
10: End
11: Determine RWSCR = Rd −Re and R = max{RWSCR, R};
12: Update x = x+ τ ;
13: Update r = r + τ .
By substituting (1) into (28), the problem defined in (28) is
still a non-convex problem due to the coupled variables β, x,
and y in both the objective function and the constraints. To
tackle this issue, we introduce a new variable u = 1
β
, then,
the problem defined in (28) reduces to the following problem
with a given position of the UAV (x, y):
max
u
1 + 1
D1+D2u
1 + 1
D3+D4u
s.t. D5 ≤ u,
D6 ≤ u,
(29)
where D1 =
ρσ2r+σ
2
ID
ρPs|hsr|2
, D2 =
σ2SI |fd|
2+σ2d
ρPs|hrdhsr|2
, D3 =
ρσ2r+σ
2
ID
ρPs|hsr|2
,
D4 =
σ2Zd|h
∗
de|
2+σ2d
ρPs|h∗rehsr|
2 , D5 =
(1−α)ρPs|hsr|
2+(1−α)ρσ2r+ρσ
2
ID
ηα(1−ρ)Ps|hsr|2−(1−α)Pcr
,
and D6 =
Ps|hsr|
2+σ2r+σ
2
ID
Pr,max
.
Following this transformation, it is easy to verify that
problem (29) is similar to problem (25). Thus, according
to Theorem 2, the optimal solutions of the problem defined
in (29) can be easily derived. Then, we propose a multi-
dimensional search to obtain the approximate optimal solu-
tions of the problem defined in (28), which is summarized
in Table III. Based on Theorem 2 and Table III, the UAV
position {x, y} and amplification factor β can be expressed
respectively as
• When D7 < max{D5, D6}, the optimal {x∗, y∗, β∗} are
given by
x∗ = x, y∗ = y, β∗ = min{ 1
D5
,
1
D6
}, (30)
where D7 =
√
D1D3+D1
D2D4
.
• When D7 ≥ max{D5, D6}, the optimal {x∗, y∗, β∗} can
be denoted as
x∗ = x, y∗ = y, β∗ =
1
D7
. (31)
Table III shows that when variables σ2Zd, α, and ρ are given,
the UAV position {x, y} and amplification factor β can be
easily found by the proposed line search. Then, we select the
variable set that corresponds to the maximum objective value
as the optimal solutions.
TABLE IV
THE PROPOSED ITERATIVE OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM.
1: Set nmax = 100, n = 0, γ = 10−5, Rn0 = 0, R
n
f
= 100;
2: Initialize Ps, ρ, x, y, and β;
3:While Rn
f
> γ and n < nmax do;
4: Calculate R∗e of (17) based on Table II;
5: Calculate σ2
Zd
∗
and α∗ by substituting (22)−(24) into (21);
6: Calculate ρ∗ of (25) based on (26) or (27);
7: Calculate (x∗, y∗) and β∗ of (28) by using (30) or (31);
8: Determine RnWCSR = R
n
d
−R∗ne ;
9: Update Rn
f
= |Rn
0
−RnWCSR|, R
n+1
0
= RnWCSR and n = n+ 1.
D. Iterative Optimization Algorithm
In this subsection, we combine the proposed solution ap-
proaches in subsections A, B, and C to develop an iterative
algorithm, which is summarized in Table IV. Specifically, a
suboptimal solution of the problem defined in (16) can be
found by the proposed iterative algorithm when its conver-
gence is guaranteed. Therefore, the convergence analysis of
our proposed algorithm is given in the following.
LEMMA 2. The convergence of the proposed iterative opti-
mization algorithm in Table IV is guaranteed.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. 
E. Computational Complexity Analysis
We define the computational complexity for the proposed
algorithm in Table IV as presented in the following: In
each iteration of Table IV, the main contributions to the
computational complexity of the proposed algorithm arise
from the complexities introduced by solving problems defined
in (17) and (28) in steps 4 and 7. In particular, the complexity
of solving (17) is O(n1N1), where n1 is the number of
eavesdroppers and N1 is the range of the k-th eavesdropper’
imperfect locations. Furthermore, the complexity of solving
(28) is O(n2N2), where n2 and N2 denote the numbers
of search radius and search steps, respectively. Thus, the
total complexity of the proposed algorithm in Table IV is
O[(n1N1+n2N2)Nite], where Nite is the number of required
iterations, which will be illustrated in the following simula-
tions.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical simulation results to
validate the performance of the proposed scheme. The setting
of simulation is discussed in the following. The channels
hsr, hrd, hrek , and hdek are assumed to be LoS channels
and the power gain β0 is 50 dBm [21], [28]. The channel
fd is modeled as Rayleigh fading distribution, following
CN (0, 1) [20]. The coordinates of the source and destination
are set to (xS , 0, 0) = (−100, 0, 0) m and (xD, 0, 0) =
(100, 0, 0) m, respectively. It is assumed that there exists three
eavesdroppers, which are randomly and uniformly distributed
within a 2D area of 150 × 150 m. The following results
are obtained based on one random realization of the eaves-
droppers estimated coordinates as (xE1 , yE1 , 0) = (0, 0, 0)
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Fig. 3. The achieved secrecy rates at different eavesdroppers versus Ps.
Solid curves present the scenarios with perfect location information, while
dashed curves are for imperfect location information.
m, (xE2 , yE2 , 0) = (0,−40, 0) m, and (xE3 , yE3 , 0) =
(−40, 0, 0) m, respectively. Furthermore, the noise variances
are assumed to be σ2r = σ
2
ID = σ
2
d = σ
2
e = −30 dBm [48].
Moreover, unless otherwise specified, η = 0.8 is the energy
conversion efficiency, Pcr = 10 dBm is the circuit power
consumption [44], Ps = 30 dBm is the transmit power at
the source, PAN,max = 20 dBm and Pr,max = 25 dBm are
the maximum transmit power of AN and UAV, respectively
[49]. In addition, Ed = 100 mW is the energy budget of
the destination, ESIC = 50 mW is the energy consumption
of SIC, ∆Qk = 5 m is the estimation error, H = 80 m is
the flight altitude, and rmax = 80 m is the maximum flight
radius, respectively.
Fig. 3 compares the secrecy rate of the proposed scheme
received at different eavesdroppers with the case of perfect
locations information (solid curves) and the imperfect loca-
tions information (dashed curves), respectively. As can be seen
in Fig. 3, the achieved secrecy rates first increase and then
become saturated as the available transmit power (Ps) at the
source increases in all cases. The reason behind this behavior
is that the harvested energy increases with the increasing
source transmit power, which provides perpetual energy for
the UAV to relay the desired information. However, when
Ps is sufficiently large, the UAV cannot fully exhaust all
the harvested energy for transmission as there is a maxi-
mum transmit power constraint at the UAV. As expected,
the achievable secrecy rate performance of the eavesdropper
with imperfect location information is worse than that of
perfect locations information due to the location estimation
errors. However, it is obvious that our proposed robust scheme
(imperfect locations) could achieve a similar performance with
the perfect scheme (perfect locations). Moreover, compared
to the achieved secrecy rate between the destination and
eavesdroppers E1 and E2, the secrecy rate between the
destination and eavesdropper E3 has the worst performance.
The reason is that eavesdroppers E1 and E2 are closer to the
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Fig. 4. The achieved secrecy rate with different source transmit powers Ps
at various UAV flight radii.
destination node D than E3, and hence, the AN jamming is
more effective on E1 and E2 to improve the secrecy rate.
Fig. 4 presents the max-min secrecy rate versus different
maximum flight radii rmax and source transmit powers Ps,
respectively. As can be seen in Fig. 4, the achieved secrecy
rate first increases and then saturates as the source transmit
power Ps increases for all considered values of the maximum
flight radius rmax, which has been explained in detail in the
previous paragraph. Moreover, with different Ps, the achieved
secrecy rate also first increases and then saturates as rmax
increases. This is because when the harvested energy meets
the energy consumption requirements at the UAV, increasing
rmax would result in a higher SINR at the destination due to
the UAV’s optimal position closer to the destination. However,
when rmax is sufficiently large, the UAV needs to harvest
more energy from the signal received from the source to
satisfy the EH constraints, which results in less information
received at the UAV. Thus, the UAV will keep the optimal
position unchanged with rmax increasing to obtain the best
system performance.
Fig. 5(a) compares the performance of our proposed robust
joint design with FD destination (denoted as JO W/FD) with
other four benchmark schemes, namely: 1) Robust FD design
without optimizing the UAV’s position (STATIC W/FD), i.e.,
(x, y,H) = (−rmax, 0, 80) m, where rmax = 10 : 5 : 80;
2) Robust FD design without optimizing the PS ratio (WPS
W/FD), i.e., ρ = 0.2; 3) Robust FD design without optimizing
the TS ratio (WTS W/FD), i.e., α = 0.7; 4) Robust joint
design with half-duplex (HD) destination (JO W/HD). From
the simulation results illustrated in Fig. 5(a), it is observed that
the max-min secrecy rate of all schemes first increases and
then saturates as the maximum flight radius rmax increases,
showing trends similar to Fig. 4. Furthermore, as expected,
the proposed algorithm achieves a superior performance when
compared with the other three FD schemes. The reason is
that the proposed joint design can exploit effectively more
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Fig. 5. Achieved secrecy rates and convergence of different algorithms:
(a) The achieved secrecy rates versus rmax. (b) The achieved secrecy rates
versus the iteration number.
degrees of freedom of the UAV’s position, PS, and TS
ratio. In addition, compared with the joint HD scheme, the
proposed joint FD scheme significantly improves the secrecy
rate since it can transmit malicious AN signal to confuse the
eavesdroppers.
Fig. 5(b) illustrates the convergence performance compar-
ison of our proposed algorithm and other four benchmark
algorithms. As can be seen in Fig. 5(b), the max-min secrecy
rate of all algorithms first increases with the number of
iterations in Table IV, and then converges to a constant within
a few iterations. In addition, it is also observed that our
proposed joint FD scheme has a similar convergence rate as
the other benchmark algorithms. From Fig. 5(b), it is noticed
that only about 4 iterations are required on average for the
convergence of the proposed algorithm.
Fig. 6 presents the achievable max-min secrecy rates ver-
sus different PS ratios ρ and source transmit powers Ps,
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Fig. 6. The effect of the PS ratio, ρ, on the max-min secrecy rates with
different source transmit powers.
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respectively. As shown in Fig. 6, the achieved secrecy rate
increases with the PS ratio until it reaches the maximum
for all considered Ps values. However, when the PS ratio ρ
is sufficiently large, the achieved secrecy rate of all curves
decreases dramatically. The reason is that when the PS ratio
ρ is large enough, a larger TS ratio α needs to be allocated
for the EH to satisfy the energy consumption requirements
at the UAV relay, which results in less time allocated for the
information forwarding within the entire communication time.
In addition, with different Ps values, it is seen that the best
performance for all considered scenarios is achieved when
ρ = 0.45. This implies that splitting the received signal at
the UAV into two unequal portions, as
√
0.45 yr for ID and√
0.55 yr for EH, appears to be the best choice.
Fig. 7 presents the achievable max-min secrecy rates versus
the AN transmit power, σ2Zd , for different source transmit
powers Ps. As seen from this figure, the achieved secrecy
rate first increases and then saturates as the AN power σ2Zd
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Fig. 8. The effect of energy consumption of SIC on the max-min secrecy
rates with different AN transmit powers.
increases, regardless of the Ps value. This is because when
PAN,max is small, increasing the AN can deteriorate the
instantaneous SINR at the eavesdropper quickly. However,
when PAN,max is large enough, the destination cannot fully
use the maximum available power to transmit AN due to the
fact that there is an energy budget constraint at the destination.
Furthermore, the system performance will also be affected
by Ed and ESIC , which will be discussed in the following
simulations.
Next, we show the achievable max-min secrecy rates versus
the energy consumption of SIC, ESIC , and for different
maximum available AN transmit power, PAN,max. From the
simulation results illustrated in Fig. 8, when PAN,max is large,
the achieved secrecy rate decreases as ESIC increases. The
reason is that increasing ESIC results in less transmission
power allocated for AN jamming at destination. Moreover, it is
worth noting that when PAN,max is small, i.e., PAN,max = 10
dBm, the achieved secrecy rate remains constant for different
ESIC values. The reason is that the destination can always
use the maximum available power to transmit AN when the
energy budget is sufficiently large.
Fig. 9 illustrates the achievable max-min secrecy rate versus
the estimation error radius ∆Qk and for different maximum
transmit power Pr,max at UAV. As presented in Fig. 9 and
as expected, the achieved secrecy rate steadily decreases as
∆Qk increases for all considered values of Pr,max. This is
because the uncertainty of eavesdroppers’ locations is larger
for a larger ∆Qk, and the resource allocation and position
design would be more conservative, in turn, this leads to a less
efficient utilization of system resources. In addition, as can be
seen in Fig. 9, when the maximum available transmit power
at the UAV is large, i.e., Pr,max = 30 dBm and Pr,max =
35 dBm, the achieved secrecy rate remains the same with
different ∆Qk. The reason is that the achieved secrecy rate is
mainly limited by EH at the UAV when the source transmit
power is small, and increasing the maximum transmit power
allowance of the UAV does not necessarily help to enhance
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Fig. 9. The effect of the estimated errors on the max-min secrecy rates with
different maximum transmit power at UAV.
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the secrecy rate performance.
Finally, we present the achieved max-min secrecy rate
versus the UAV flight height, H , and for different source
transmit power, Ps. As shown in Fig. 10, the achievable
secrecy rate increases with increasing H before a saturation
point for all the source transmit power Ps assumptions.
However, when the flight heightH is larger than the saturation
point, the achieved secrecy rates decrease dramatically. The
reason is that when H is sufficiently large, the UAV needs
to harvest more energy from the signal received from the
source to satisfy the EH constraints, which results in less
information received at the UAV. Moreover, as seen in Fig. 10,
the achievable secrecy rate finally reaches the saturation point
when Ps is sufficiently large. The reason behind this behavior
is that the total harvested energy increases as Ps increases,
which enables a higher transmission power available for the
UAV.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the robust joint design for an energy-
constrained UAV secure communication system with imper-
fect eavesdropper locations. In the proposed scheme, with
the help of an FD destination transmitting artificial noise to
confuse the eavesdroppers, the position of the UAV, the PS
and TS ratios as well as the AN power at the FD destination
were jointly designed to maximize the minimum secrecy rate
under the EH requirement and transmit power constraints.
Due to the non-convexity of the design problem, a three-
step iterative algorithm was developed to obtain a suboptimal
solution of the considered problem. Furthermore, the system
performance was evaluated for different system parameters
and practical implementation issues were discussed. Finally,
numerical results demonstrated that for the case of multiple
eavesdroppers with imperfect location information, adopting
the proposed FD jamming-based joint design can achieve a
significant improvement in the max-min secrecy rate com-
pared to the benchmark schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Suppose {R∗1, R∗2} and {f1, f2} denote the optimal
values and the objective functions of problem (19) and
(20), respectively. First, based on [m]+ defined in (16) and
due to the fact that problems (19) and (20) have the same
constraints, we have f1 ≥ f2 and R∗1 ≥ R∗2. Next, we prove
that R∗2 ≥ R∗1 also holds. Denote {σ2Zd∗, α∗, ρ∗, β∗, (x, y)∗}
as the optimal solution of the problem defined in (19).
Moreover, we also construct a feasible solution to
problem (20), denoted by {σ2Zd†, α†, ρ†, β†, (x, y)†},
such that σ2Zd
†
= σ2Zd
∗
, α† = α∗, ρ† = ρ∗, and
β† = β∗. When f1(σ
2
Zd
∗
, α∗, ρ∗, β∗, (x, y)∗) ≥ 0, we
have (x, y)† = (x, y)∗; otherwise (x, y)† = 0. By substituting
{σ2Zd†, α†, ρ†, β†, (x, y)†} into (20), we obtain the objective
value f2(σ
2
Zd
†
, α†, ρ†, β†, (x, y)†) = R†2. Thus, the newly
constructed solution {σ2Zd†, α†, ρ†, β†, (x, y)†} ensures that
R
†
2 = R
∗
1. Due to the fact that {σ2Zd†, α†, ρ†, β†, (x, y)†} is
a feasible solution to problem (20), it follows that R∗2 ≥ R†2.
As a result, we have R∗2 ≥ R∗1. Therefore, combining both
parts above, the relationship R∗1 = R
∗
2 holds. This completes
the proof of Lemma 1. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Suppose problem (21) is feasible and let {α∗, σ2Zd∗} repre-
sent its optimal solution. First, let us define f as the objective
function of the problem defined in (21), then we obtain the
first-order partial derivative of f with respect to α and σ2Zd,
respectively:
∂f
∂α
= −
[
A1 − log2
(
1 +
A2
A3 + σ2Zd
)]
, (32)
and
∂f
∂σ2Zd
=
A2(1− α)
ln 2
[
(A3 + σ2Zd)
2 +A2(A3 + σ2Zd)
] .
(33)
Based on f defined in (21) and due to the fact that
{A1, A2, A3} > 0, we have ∂f∂α < 0 and ∂f∂σ2
Zd
> 0.
Next, we prove that the optimal solutions α∗ and σ2Zd
∗
must satisfy the constraints C1 or C2 and C1 or C3 with
equality, respectively. This can be proved by contradiction.
Namely, if the above conditions are not satisfied, we can
find another solution of problem (21), denoted by {α†, σ2Zd†},
which achieves a higher objective value. In this case, for
any given σ2Zd, constraints C1 and C2 can be equivalently
rewritten as
α ≥ 1 + A4
σ2Zd
, (34)
and
α ≥ A5. (35)
Due to the fact that ∂f
∂α
< 0, the objective function f is strictly
monotonically decreasing with respect to α, and it can be
observed that when α∗ = max{1 + A4
σ2
Zd
, A5}, the objective
value f(α∗) > f(α†). Similarly, for a given α, constraints C1
and C3 can be expressed respectively as:
σ2Zd ≤ −
A4
1− α, (36)
and
σ2Zd ≤ PAN,max. (37)
As a result, when σ2Zd
∗
= min{− A41−α , PAN,max}, we can
easily obtain f(σ2Zd
∗
) > f(σ2Zd
†
) based on the fact that the
objective function f is a strictly increasing function with
respect to σ2Zd. Thus, these contradict our assumption. In
conclusion, the optimal solution {α∗, σ2Zd∗} must satisfy EH
or transmit power constraint with equality.
Moreover, for given {α∗, σ2Zd∗}, we can prove that at
least two constraints of problem (21) are satisfied with
equality. This can also be proved by contradiction. Firstly,
suppose optimal solutions {α∗, σ2Zd∗} can be obtained when
only constraint C2 is satisfied with equality. In this case,
for a given α, the objective function value increases as
σ2Zd increases due to
∂f
∂σ2
Zd
> 0. Therefore, the objective
function can achieve a higher value when constraint C1 or
C3 are satisfied with equality. Thus, this assumption is not
valid. Secondly, for the other assumptions where only one
constraint is satisfied with equality, we can easily prove that
these assumptions are not valid either. Combining both parts
above, the optimal solution {α∗, σ2Zd∗} of problem (21) can
be obtained as the three cases provided in (22)−(24). This
completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Due to the fact that B1 = B3, the problem (25) can be
equivalently rewritten as
max
m
(B4 −B2)m
m2 + B1B4+B2B3+B2
B2B4
m+ B1B3+B1
B2B4
s.t. 1 < B5 ≤ m,
B6 ≤ m.
(38)
Suppose f(·) denotes the objective function of (38) and then
f(m) = (B4−B2)m
m2+
B1B4+B2B3+B2
B2B4
m+
B1B3+B1
B2B4
. First, we calculate
the first-order derivative of f with respect to m as
df
dm
=
−(B4 −B2)(m2 −B27)(
m2 + B1B4+B2B3+B2
B2B4
m+ B1B3+B1
B2B4
)2 , (39)
where B7 = ±
√
B1B3+B1
B2B4
. If B2 < B4, based on m ≥
max{B5, B6} from (25), we can derive that the relationship
B7 < m holds when B7 < max{B5, B6}, i.e.,
√
B1B3+B1
B2B4
<
max{B5, B6}. Then, substituting into (39), we have dfdm < 0,
which shows that the objective function value decreases as
m increases. Therefore, there must exist a maximum value
of the objective function f(m∗) when the two constraints of
the problem defined in (38) are satisfied with equality. The
optimal solution m∗ of problem (38) can be expressed as
m∗ = max{B5, B6}. (40)
Hence, based on m = 1
ρ
, we can obtain the optimal solution
as in (26).
Similarly, when B2 < B4, if B7 ≥ m, due to the fact
that m ≥ max{B5, B6}, we can derive that the inequality
df
dm
≥ 0 holds when
√
B1B3+B1
B2B4
≥ m ≥ max{B5, B6}. As a
result, the objective function f(m∗) is strictly monotonically
increasing with respect to m. Hence, the optimal solution m∗
of problem (38) can be derived as
m∗ = B7. (41)
Next, if
√
B1B3+B1
B2B4
≥ max{B5, B6} and
√
B1B3+B1
B2B4
≤ m,
we have df
dm
≤ 0, which shows that the value of the objective
function decreases as m increases. Thus, the optimal solution
m∗ of the problem defined in (38) can be attained as in
(41). Combining both parts above, we show that the optimal
solution can be expressed as in (27).
Finally, we show that B2 ≥ B4 is not possible at the
optimal solution ρ∗. We prove this result by contradiction. In
this case, for given B2 ≥ B4, the objective function f(m) of
problem (38) is negative, i.e., f(m) ≤ 0. It is easy to verify
that the above condition does not hold due to the worst-case
secrecy rate determined in problem (16). In conclusion,
the optimal solution ρ∗ of (25) can be only obtained when
B2 < B4. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
At the nth iteration, due to the limitation of the estimation
errors ∆Qk, the approximation optimal solution R
∗
e of the
problem defined in (17) must be firstly obtained by adjusting
the search interval τ . Since the other three subproblems
(21), (25), and (28) can be optimally solved through steps
5, 6, and 7 in Table IV, respectively, the value of the
objective function in problem (16) must be monotonically
nondecreasing for this step. Because of that, if the objective
value RnWCSR decreases, we could keep the same optimal
solutions σ2Zd
(n−1)∗
, α(n−1)∗, ρ(n−1)∗, (x, y)(n−1)∗ or
β(n−1)∗ unchanged. In addition, the constraints of all
subproblems form a compact set, and thus, the objective
value of problem (16) is bounded. The monotonicity and
bound guarantee that the iterative optimization algorithm
converges to a stationary point [47]. This completes the proof
of Lemma 2. 
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